Why IoT Apps are Eating Device Interfaces Tags:#Apple#mobile#news#web Related Posts Verizon has just announced it will be holding a press conference following this week’s Consumer Electronics Show (CES 2011). The invite to the event, which will be held at New York City’s Lincoln Center (Frederick P. Rose Hall) on January 11, is arriving in select journalists’ inboxes as we speak. As for the host? It’s Lowell McAdam, Verizon President and COO.Oh yes, this must be the Verizon iPhone.Given the timing, and the lack of any Apple mention (or even a hint!) during the Verizon keynote at CES, the conclusion is that this is indeed the announcement everyone has been waiting for: the Verizon iPhone, at long last.There’s really no other news beyond that, only this mysterious invite: Role of Mobile App Analytics In-App Engagement The Rise and Rise of Mobile Payment Technology Image credit: AllThingsD – it’s no surprise that they’re on the list. Please, please let it come in white!For more proof of the Verizon iPhone’s existence, see this post: “What’s the status of the Verizon iPhone?“And let’s not forget this recently leaked video from smartphone parts firm Global Direct Parts. The video, which was subsequently pulled from YouTube by either Apple.com (as it claimed) or some jokester claiming to be Apple (DMCA takedown notices are often automated), appeared to show a comparison of parts between the current iPhone 4 and some future fifth-generation phone.This is a backup copy: sarah perez What it Takes to Build a Highly Secure FinTech …
TagsTransfersOpinionAbout the authorPhillip Ekuwem FollowShare the loveHave your say Tottenham Transfer Watch: Four left-backs Pochettino should targetby Phillip Ekuwem10 months agoSend to a friendShare the loveDanny Rose’s performances have waned over the past season – whilst he still has it in him to put up great displays, he’s nowhere near as consistent as he once was, which has sparked concerns amongst the Tottenham faithful. Ben Davies when featuring in the squad has been decent, but not particularly impressive thus leaving Spurs with the need to sign a new left-back going into the second half of the Premier League campaign.Alex TellesPorto star Alex Telles has been linked with a host of European clubs over the past few seasons thanks to his impressive performances in the Liga Nos where he’s established himself as one of the best left-backs in the League.He’s exceptional at defending but his blistering pace and dribbling ability also allows him to make overlapping runs so he often appears like a winger in game’s where he’s been tasked with doing so due to his expansive skill set.Telles is an amazing crosser of the ball as he’s able to find his teammates in the midst of opposition players with great balls into the box.Video Courtesy of SoccerAlejandro GrimaldoAnother Liga Nos star that’s attracted a lot of attention from top European sides recently, including Tottenham’s – Alejandro Grimaldo is a pacey left-back with great awareness and positioning.The Benfica star draws parallels with his countryman, Jordi Alba, as they have similar styles of play. Grimaldo utilises his pace to get into positions that will allow him to intercept the ball – his dribbling ability also allows him to play the ball out of the back and venture forward when need be.Tottenham reportedly tried to acquire his services back in July but had a bid turned down – they could yet make another attempt out of necessity come January.Video Courtesy of ScoutNationHDPatrick Van AanholtVan Aanholt is well known in the Premier League for his pace and strength. The Dutchman is undoubtedly one of the fastest players in the entire league thus making him a key asset at Crystal Palace as he’s able to defend against other fast players who would normally have an easy time running in behind defensive set-ups.He’s been linked with moves to Juventus and Roma with Alex Sandro reportedly on his way to Chelsea and Aleksander Kolarov not getting any younger but considering Spurs’ need – Mauricio Pochettino need not look any further than Van Annholt.Video Courtesy of MPGKieran TierneyOver the past few seasons, Kieran Tierney has proven to be the best left-back in the Scottish Premier League. He’s got all the attributes of a quality left-back, he just needs the right manager and the right team for him to become a world-class player – Mauricio Pochettino and Tottenham can offer that.He’s got blistering pace, and whilst he might not be particularly strong, he’s an amazing defender who’s able to read the game well and would be a great signing for Spurs.Video Courtesy of WorldOfFootballHD
COLUMBUS, OH – SEPTEMBER 27: Ohio State Buckeyes fans cheer on their team against the Minnesota Golden Gophers on September 27, 2008 at Ohio Stadium in Columbus, Ohio. (Photo by Jamie Sabau/Getty Images)A couple of Ohio State’s best players, Cardale Jones and Michael Thomas, took to Twitter this morning to voice their opinions on a social matter. The Buckeyes’ quarterback and wide receiver each published a series of tweets regarding the #BlackLivesMatter movement. While college football players (and most of the population) would probably be better off not ever going on Twitter, it was nice to see two of the sport’s premier players speak their minds. This apparently upset some of Ohio State’s fan base, as Jones and Thomas were both told by Twitter users to stop talking and just worry about the 2015 season. Jones, Thomas and Buckeye quarterback Stephen Collier then used Twitter to call out these fans. Cool it.. We can’t afford the NCAA suspending you https://t.co/bP2TJ9EqtJ— Smash Williams (@matteojustquit) July 23, 2015This my Twitter my voice so mind yah business buddy.. Thank you https://t.co/yon6DFmOK2— Mike Thomas (@Cantguardmike) July 23, [email protected] Sorry Mr master, I aints allow to tweet nothing but foolsball stuff I donts want you think I more than a foots ball playa sir— Cardale Jones (@CJ12_) July 23, 2015Ignorant. https://t.co/HtVjQSG1SH— Stephen Collier (@S13Collier) July 23, 2015One thing about your own opinion, ITS YOURS!— Cardale Jones (@CJ12_) July 23, 2015Every college football fan base has its share of psychos, so this is not an indictment on the type of people who root for Ohio State. Keep speaking your mind, Cardale and Michael.
November 26, 2014HAPPY THANKSGIVING to family and friends near and far.Much to be grateful for! Here are a few snapshots by photographer Ivan Pintar of the very early years at Arcosanti. Ivan was part of the Cosanti Foundation from the early 1960’s until his death at Cosanti in 1994. The Soleri Archives at Arcosanti houses his enormous slide collection.Here we see silt preparation of the panels for the South Vault.The side panels of the Vaults are in place, also the foundations of the Ceramics Apse.The South Vault.This photo is by Annette Del Zoppo.View from the top of the Vaults to the Ceramics Apse and Foundry.Silt work on the Foundry Apse.The Foundry Apse roof pour.Paolo Soleri on the silt for the Foundry apartment roof.
Chapter 2: Humbling the Oligarchs For a national leader wishing to cement a hold on power—especially a would-be autocrat—nothing beats war. Turning the children of the common folk into soldiers and sending them to do battle with a feared or hated enemy tends to unite those folk in support of whoever is in charge, no matter what the actual reason for the fighting. It works in any country. So it was with Putin and Chechnya. Although the breakaway republic wasn’t exactly a foreign country, to most Russians it might as well have been. So they fell right in line behind their aggressive new president and his Chechnya campaign. Putin is always ready for the next move, the zag after the zig. He recognized that as quickly as war wins the population over to your side, the advantage can just as quickly be lost. The longer a war goes on, the more likely people are to turn against it. Lose a war, and everyone decides they were against it all along. So to gain from a bloody conflict, a leader needs a swift, decisive victory. The First Chechen War had left Russians with a sour taste in their mouths. It went on for two years and ended with their well-equipped, modern army failing against a posse of back-country guerrillas—a replay of Afghanistan in Russia’s own backyard. No one was in the mood for more of the same. The people rallied behind Putin because they detected his willingness to do whatever it took to get the job done. What else would you expect from an ex-KGB officer? Predictably, Putin went at the Chechens with maximum firepower and subdued them with minimum loss of Russian lives. After that, Russia’s lingering troubles with the republic hardly mattered. The war had ended quickly, and it had ended in victory, a demonstration of Putin’s strength for all to see. No more wishy-washy leaders in the Kremlin. A real man was back at the helm. The people cheered. Disposing of an outside threat was important as a first step toward Putin’s goal of reestablishing Russian might, with himself as the revered leader. It was the relatively simple part, however. Next, he had to deal with his political enemies. Some were easy to identify. The drifting policies of the Yeltsin years had fostered a small class of crafty and often violent billionaires, a wild bunch known as the oligarchs. In the words of a former deputy chairman of Russia’s central bank: “All Russian oligarchs are fiendishly ingenious, fiendishly strong, malicious, and greedy—tough customers to deal with.” Land of Opportunity During the 1990s, the country was struggling to adopt the ways of a free-market society. After 70 years of enforced collectivism, suffocation by central planning, and the quashing of individual initiative, Russia’s freedom makeover wasn’t going smoothly. The transition from centralized command and control to free markets was hindered by a massive flight of domestic capital, foreign investors deserting the country, a sharp rise in unemployment, widespread failure to meet payrolls for those who actually held jobs, and a precipitous drop in the foreign-exchange value of the ruble (which hit its all-time low in late 1993). Before the early 1990s, there wasn’t even a stock market. Three generations of Russians had toiled under the threat of communism’s gulags and been trained to look to Moscow for decisions in all matters. And that was after three and a half centuries of submission to czarist rule. Suddenly, people were thrown into a situation they weren’t prepared for and had no experience with. That they were overwhelmed by their first whiff of freedom was hardly a surprise. Most were utterly lost, but not all. As state control of enterprises withered, a few crafty individuals saw they could exploit what was happening. Some were already wealthy, whereas others simply seized the opportunity to start a fortune. What they all had in common was an aptitude for business that was in such short supply in Russia. The best that can be said of the oligarchs is that they were ready for economic freedom when almost no one else was. They certainly helped with the transition to a market economy. But in a society where cronyism, bribery, extortion, and murder for hire are normal, it would be a stretch to argue that these newly minted billionaires came by their fortunes in an honest way. They were utterly ruthless. But they would soon learn that someone else was even more so: Vladimir Putin. Nailing Khodorkovsky Putin realized early on that the key to Russia’s rebirth was its vast wealth of natural resources. Oil, gas, uranium—the country had them all in abundance. All figured into his master plan. And because of their importance, energy companies could not be allowed to fall under the control of foreign investors, no matter what. Even domestic private owners would have to answer to the state or, more to the point, to Putin. The oligarchs mattered to Putin not merely because of their wealth but because energy was precisely the industry in which they were most prominent. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was the richest and most powerful of them, with a fortune of $18 billion. In his struggle with the oligarchs, Putin’s contest with Khodorkovsky was the decisive battle. When it ended—with Khodorkovsky and others stripped of their wealth and imprisoned, exiled, or dead—there was no doubt that Putin would be the overlord of Russia’s energy sector. And he would be thanked for what he did. As with Chechnya, attacking the oligarchs was a hit with the public, who resented both their great wealth and how they had gotten it. Seeing them humbled amped up Putin’s popularity yet again. The Khodorkovsky match was not the only front in Putin’s war with the oligarchs. But it was the splashiest, and it best illustrates his methods. Like Putin, Khodorkovsky had spent his childhood in a shabby communal apartment and, also like Putin, he had ambition to spare. After working as a leader in Komsomol, a communist youth organization, he opened the Youth Center for Scientific and Technological Development. Later he founded an import/export firm. As he transitioned from communist to capitalist, Khodorkovsky came to believe that the new Russian economy should be centered on high-tech industries rather than on natural resources. That put him in conflict with Putin’s notion that resources are the natural engine for Russia’s economic progress. Khodorkovsky became a prominent advocate for a free market. In 1993, he published the Russian capitalist manifesto, The Man with the Ruble. In it he wrote: “It is time to stop living according to Lenin! Our guiding light is Profit, acquired in a strictly legal way. Our Lord is His Majesty, Money, for it is only He who can lead us to wealth as the norm in life.” Khodorkovsky’s compliance with the law was noticeably far from strict. But that was the norm at the time. Several of his early millionaire colleagues had gotten so closely involved with criminals that they eventually had to flee the country to save their lives and the lives of their families. Shootings in public view were common, as were kidnappings of women and children. It was all part of the cost of doing business. That Khodorkovsky’s import/export company was known to violate dozens of laws surprised no one, and by comparison with many others he was a goody-goody. It was entering the financial arena that put Khodorkovsky on track to join the billionaires’ club. And it was through Bank Menatep that he positioned himself to become the richest man in the new Russia. Vouchers Bank Menatep, which Khodorkovsky established in 1989, made significant profits, reportedly enhanced by diverted state funds. The bank also operated a lucrative market for trading state privatization vouchers, which turned out to be more than just another profit center. Though it seems crazy now, the voucher program must have made sense to Boris Yeltsin at the time. He initiated it in 1992 on a day when, perhaps, he was heavily into the vodka. Yeltsin proposed that every man, woman, and child in Russia be issued a voucher that could be exchanged for shares in one of the state enterprises undergoing privatization. That way, Yeltsin was convinced, every citizen would gain a stake in the emerging capitalist economy. However, consistent with capitalist principles, everyone would be free to trade or sell his or her voucher if one chose to. The voucher idea had been imported to Russia by consulting economists from the United States. It made good sense in a textbook kind of way. But it made no sense at all if the vouchers were going to be issued to people who didn’t understand what the pieces of paper represented. Over 140 million Russians participated in the grand voucher program, the great majority of them cash poor and lacking even a rudimentary comprehension of capital markets. Most chose to capture a little cash immediately by selling their vouchers. That played right into the hands of anyone with a bit of investment sense—especially the oligarchs. They were ready and able to accommodate the millions of Russians who knew nothing about the vouchers except that they could be turned into instant cash. Buying on the very cheap, they gained control of formerly state-run companies, which concentrated an astronomical amount of wealth and power in the hands of a very few. Khodorkovsky topped the list of those who made the people’s ignorance his gain. Through Bank Menatep and a separate holding company, he took control of a string of companies for mere kopecks on the ruble. It wasn’t quite theft, but it was a process in which informed consent played no role whatsoever. In 1995, Group Menatep moved on Yukos, a major petroleum conglomerate. Yukos had been assembled by the Russian government in 1993 to roll up dozens of state-owned production, refining, and distribution assets, including one of the most productive oil fields in western Siberia. Like most other Russian companies struggling to adapt to a market economy, its performance had been dismal. Oil production rates were declining, employees were months behind in getting paid, and financial controls were haphazard. Khodorkovsky set out to grab Yukos and fix it. He captured Yukos in two bold moves and in so doing demonstrated that he was a wily businessman, someone to be reckoned with. Vladimir Putin—at the time still working for the mayor of St. Petersburg, but with his eye on higher office—took notice. Perhaps, given his dispassion in separating ends from means, he even admired how Khodorkovsky operated. It happened this way: First, knowing that the Yeltsin administration was strapped for cash, Bank Menatep participated in the ill-fated “Loans for Shares” program. Under the arrangement, Yeltsin’s government pledged shares in several of Russia’s most profitable companies as collateral for loans from oligarch-controlled banks. The value of the collateral was several times more than the value of the loans secured. If the state defaulted—and its debilitated condition made that likely—the lending bank was supposed to auction off the shares. But the auctions that actually took place were rigged. Everything was carefully planned to exclude anyone who might outbid the lending bank. In this instance, Bank Menatep lent the Kremlin $159 million under conditions that virtually ensured default. For collateral, the Kremlin pledged 45 percent of Yukos, which at that point was worth over $3 billion, or some 20 times the size of the loan. Then, when the government indeed defaulted, Khodorkovsky effectively swapped the IOU Bank Menatep was holding for nearly half of Yukos. Days later, to gain full control, Menatep purchased another 33 percent of Yukos from Yeltsin’s desperate government for just $150 million, or about 15 cents on the dollar. Over the next several years, Khodorkovsky brought the company back to health. In 2002 Yukos became the first Russian oil company to pay dividends to its shareholders, and by 2003 it was accounting for 20 percent of all Russian oil production and 2 percent of the world’s. It had become the country’s second-largest taxpayer, covering 4 percent of the Russian federal budget. This was quite a high standing for a company about to be smashed. Whether Putin could have succeeded in moving on Khodorkovsky in a different political and economic climate is difficult to judge. But he clearly made savvy use of the man’s past. You’ve just read an excerpt from Marin Katusa’s new book, The Colder War: How the Global Energy Trade Slipped from America’s Grasp. Click here to order your copy now.